The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable
Volume 4 | Issue 1

1-1-1997

Jeffersonian Teledemocracy
Howard DeLong

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/roundtable
Recommended Citation
DeLong, Howard (1997) "Jeffersonian Teledemocracy," The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/roundtable/vol4/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in The University of Chicago Law
School Roundtable by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Article 6

Jeffersonian Teledemocracy
HOWARD DELONG t

In a speech before the House of Commons on November 11, 1947,
Winston Churchill repeated what had long since become a common opinion
among democrats. "No one pretends," Churchill observed, "that democracy is
perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form
of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to
time." 1 Although Churchill's claim has remained entrenched, it is only partly
true. Democracy is certainly better than its rivals. It is also true that the
serious faults which democracies exhibit worldwide provide evidence that it
may be a bad form of government. But that it must be a bad form is doubtful. I believe that an analysis of political thought from America's founding era
can justify the doubt and thus raise the hope that democratic politics can
exhibit a high degree of excellence.
Although democracies have existed at various times in human history-for
example, in medieval Iceland and Switzerland-there have been only two
important periods of democracy. The first began in Greece toward the end of
the sixth century B.C. It lasted about two centuries. The second began in
America in the second half of the eighteenth century. So far it has also lasted
about two centuries. The American revolutionists took history seriously and
tried to learn from past errors. What is surprising is their hostility to the
Greek experiment. According to Alexander Hamilton, "[t]he ancient democracies, in which the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of
good government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure deformity:
When they assembled, the field of debate presented an ungovernable mob, not
only incapable of deliberation, but prepared for every enormity."' Modem
scholarship has not ratified Hamilton's sweeping and harsh judgment. Athenian
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Peter Skagestad for their criticisms of earlier versions of this paper. In addition, he
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and from Cynthia Butos and Beverly Wall regarding a question of grammar.
1. Robert Rhodes James, ed, 7 Winston S. Churchill, His Complete Speeches: 18971963 7566 (Chelsea 1974).
2. Harold C. Syrett, ed, 5 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 39 (Columbia 1962).
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democracy, for example, was very much concerned with liberty and equality?
Yet Hamilton's hostility was not to democracy itself, but to mob rule; in fact,
"4
he believed the best form of government to be a "representative democracy.
Thomas Jefferson also stressed representation. The ancient Greeks, Jefferson
said, "knew no medium between a democracy .. . and an abandonment of
themselves to an aristocracy, or a tyranny independent of the people. . . . The

full experiment of a government democratical, but representative, was and is
still reserved for us ....

The introduction of this new principle of representa-

tive democracy has rendered useless almost everything written before on the
structure of government. " '
The problem of achieving representation in practice, however, was often
formidable. As James Madison observed in his notes of the Federal Convention: "if the opinions of the people were to be our guide, it wd. be difficult to
say what course we ought to take. No member of the Convention could say
what the opinions of his Constituents were at this time; much less could he
say what they would think if possessed of the information & lights possessed
by the members here."' So what could be done? One option was to make
legislators statistically representative with respect to profession. The Founders
agreed with Hamilton that this option was "altogether visionary." 7 There are
too many professions and free elections would not produce such outcomes.
Instead a legal model was adopted: as a lawyer represents a client, so government officials represent the people. In the words of John Adams: "Rulers are
no more than attorneys, agents, and trustees, for the people .. . .
Yet the study of ancient democracies convinced the Founders that rulers
should not represent all the opinions of the people, but only what Jefferson
called the "common reason of society" 9 and Madison "the cool and deliberate
sense of the community."" ° The Founders' intention can be understood by
looking at the individual. Individuals know that they will have weak moments
in the future. Hence they can take a variety of self-paternalistic actions to
guard against those moments. Thus, a man might authorize friends to prevent
him-with force if necessary-from driving home if he gets drunk at a party.
A democratic people might likewise authorize the government to prevent the
people-with force if necessary-from lynching a person who has not received
a fair trial. A representative democracy, as understood by the Founders, is

3. Mogens Herman Hansen, Was Athens a Democracy? Popular Rule, Liberty and
Equality in Ancient and Modern Political Thought 25-28 (Royal Danish Academy 1989).
4. Harold C. Syrett, ed, 1 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 255 (Columbia 1961).
5. Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed, 1S The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 65-66 (Jefferson
Mem Assoc 1905).
6. Max Farrand, ed, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 215 (Yale rev
ed 1937).
7. Harold C. Syrett, ed, 4 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 479 (Columbia 1962).
8. Charles Francis Adams, ed, 3 The Works of John Adams 456 (Little Brown 1851).
9. Paul Leicester Ford, ed, 10 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 44 (Putnam 1899).
10. Robert A. Rutland, ed, 10 The Papers of James Madison 546 (Chicago 1977).
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structured to insure the triumph, in political matters, of critical reason over
irrational desire. "[I]t is the reason of the public alone," Madison maintained,
"that ought to controul and regulate the government. The passions ought to
be controuled and regulated by the government.""
Yet it is a mistake to think that representatives need only use their reason
and that, since reason is universal, their actions will automatically be consistent
with the reason of the people. It is a mistake because reason is not always
universal in the requisite sense. "When men exercise their reason coolly and
freely, on a variety of distinct questions," Madison points out, "they inevitably
fall into different opinions on some of them. When they are governed by a
common passion, their opinions, if they are so to be called, will be the
same." 2 Madison had no answer to the question of how the reason of the
public, which he believed should prevail, could even be known let alone
triumph on those occasions when it was different from the reason of the
rulers. Jefferson, however, did. In a letter to John Adams, he proposed that
Virginia be divided into small political units called wards. Then a "general call
of ward-meetings... on the same day thro' the state would at any time
produce the genuine sense of the people on any required point, and would
enable the state to act in mass, as your people have so often done, and with
so much effect, by their town meetings."' 3 Jefferson considered wards so
important that he called them the "most admirable of all human contrivances
in government."14 They were the means by which the common reason of
society would be an effective remedy to the ineptitude and corruption that are
so characteristic of political life.
Virginia never implemented a system of wards. In a real sense, Jefferson's
idea was ahead of its time because its development requires a host of disciplines, such as sampling theory, and a host of technologies, such as telecommunications, which did not then exist. The proposal is perhaps the first ever
made for what is now called teledemocracy (literally, democracy at a distance).
In teledemocracy the people do not assemble en masse; only their views, so to
say, are assembled into a collective decision. In Jeffersonian teledemocracy
those views must be the product of deliberation conducted in small groups.
Jefferson saw that the self-interest of rulers corrupts the representative process
of democratic government. As a remedy he proposed a political mechanism
which would express the common reason of the people and thereby check or
destroy the power of rulers who are unfaithful to that reason. In spite of
Jefferson's enthusiastic advocacy, and in spite of his status as one of the
greatest democrats of all time, his idea has received little attention either as a
theory or as a practical proposal for political reform.

11. Id at 463.
12. Id at 472.
13. Lester J. Cappon, ed, 2 The Adams-Jefferson Letters 390 (N Carolina 1959).
14. Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed, 14 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 454 (Jefferson
Mem Assoc 1905).
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I will attempt to remedy that neglect by providing a sketch of a deliberative teledemocracy in the spirit of Jefferson. My aim is the comparatively
modest one of showing that Jeffersonian teledemocracy might be a fruitful
idea. To demonstrate that it is actually fruitful is beyond my competence and
would, in any case, require many scholars both to articulate theory and
perform political experiments. Since a fruitful idea is one that illuminates many
areas, I must of necessity refer to a large variety of topics. For this I apologize
in advance, and hope others will pursue what is here only an incomplete
summary.
I. A Court of Common Reason

Jefferson states that in the wards "the voice of the whole people would
be ...

fairly, fully, and peaceably expressed, discussed, and decided by the

common reason of the society.""5 Now let us suppose that Congress creates
a court of common reason and establishes a federal department to run it. To
insure equality, the court chooses a large, statistically representative group of
Americans to serve on an advisory jury. Its members would be chosen so that
there would be a high degree of certainty that the deliberative voice of the jury
would match the deliberative "voice of the whole people." Of course, infants,
the senile, etc., would be excluded, but if, for example, Californians are x
percent of Americans, Californians will be x percent of the jury; if there is y
percent of the population who earn less than $12,000 a year, then there will
be y percent of such individuals on the jury, and so forth. The jury's job
would be to deliberate and answer political questions. Their answers could
guide the President, members of Congress, judges, and other public officials in
the performance of their duties. The kinds of questions that could come before
the court are almost endless: What sorts of information may be kept secret
from the public? What kinds of taxes should the government impose? Under
what conditions should abortion be allowed? What is the social cost of
smoking? How many people should be allowed to immigrate? Even secondorder questions could be used. For example, one part of the jury could be
asked to approve the questions (say, on welfare) which would then be put to
another part of the jury. Of course, decisions would not be determined for all
time, but would be periodically revisited, so a point of view that fails on one
occasion may triumph at a later time, when the people's considered judgments
have changed. State and local courts could likewise be established.
As in ordinary courtrooms, the advisory jury would hear opposing arguments, whose presentation is governed by fair and impartial rules. The competition among opposing arguments would help ensure that the jury's decisions
are products of critical reason. Before listening to arguments and deliberating,
the jury is divided into subjuries, each consisting of twelve people. Each
subjury will have its own jury room and be isolated from other subjuries. This

15. Ford, 10 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 44 (cited in note 9).
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will protect against groupthink and mob decision. As Madison warned, "In all
very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails
to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates,
every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.""6 A decision of a
subjury counts only if the decision is unanimous. As in a trial jury, the
requirement of unanimity promotes the goal of a considered judgment, since
each must convince others if his or her point of view is to prevail. The
decision of the entire advisory jury is determined by a plurality of the decisions
of those subjuries that achieve unanimity. For example, suppose an advisory
jury of 12,000 people is divided into 1,000 subjuries. On a given question the
total of the subjuries might be 487 affirmative, 301 negative and 212 undecided (unanimity not being achieved in those subjuries). Hence the advice to
governmental officials is affirmative. If 10 percent of the subjuries are negative
and the rest undecided, the advice is weakly negative; if 85 percent of the
subjuries are affirmative, the advice is strongly affirmative. The court of
common reason thus measures the strength, as well as the nature, of the
people's advice. The probability of a subjury being unanimous can be increased
by posing a number of questions at once. Compromise can then be achieved
by vote trading: ("I will vote with you on the second question, if you vote
with me on the third.") In short, the aim of a court of common reason is to
create an environment in which the people could identify their informed values,
come to considered judgments, and make'responsible decisions.
The size of the advisory jury can be enlarged indefinitely to increase civic
participation. Equally important it can be split to increase efficiency. Critics
who claim that direct democracy must be inefficient overlook this simple point:
just as creating superfast computers requires parallel processing, where a
number of computations are carried out by different microprocessors at the
same time, so the efficient determination of the common reason of society
requires parallel deliberation, where a number of subjuries deliberate on
different aspects of that reason at the same time. For example, a 12,000member advisory jury could decide ten questions simultaneously by being split
into ten parts of 1,200 each, so each part-consisting of 100 subjuries-could,
in the same time frame, answer a separate question. '
A court of common reason is a democratic marketplace for political ideas.
In the abstract, one cannot compare the aesthetic value, or taste, of carrots,
peaches and shrimp, but an ordinary marketplace enables us to compare concretely their economic value at a given time and place. Similarly, one cannot
compare abstractly the commercial claim to exploit a piece of government
property for coal versus the conservationist claim that the land should not be
disturbed. Yet a court of common reason enables us to compare concretely the
political value of these claims at a given time and place. A command polity is
no more necessary than a command economy.
By eighteenth-century standards, the American revolution itself was

16. Rutland, 10 The Papers of James Madison at 505 (cited in note 10).
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authorized by deliberative teledemocracy. This is how John Adams described
the process in a letter to his wife Abigail on July 3, 1776:
Time has been given for the whole People, maturely to consider the great
Question of Independence and to ripen their Judgments, dissipate their
Fears, and allure their Hopes, by discussing it in News Papers and
Pamphletts, by debating it, in Assemblies, Conventions, Committees of
Safety and Inspection, in Town and County Meetings, as well as in
private Conversations, so that the whole People
in every Colony of the
17
13, have now adopted it, as their own Act.
Near the end of his life George Washington, the leader of that revolution,
referred to the deliberative standard as guiding his whole career: "It always
has been, and will continue to be, my earnest desire to learn, and to comply,
as far as is consistent, with the public sentiment; but it is on great occasions
only, and after time has been given for cool and deliberate reflection, that the
real voice of the people can be known."" Today our political leaders are in
the same position as Washington: they can reliably know the "real voice of the
people" only on infrequent occasions. But they have little excuse for their
ignorance: the growth of knowledge since the eighteenth century makes
possible a new political option, namely, to routinely decipher the "real voice
of the people." Our failure to exercise this option is one of desire, not
opportunity.
II. The Dearth of Desire
A skeptic might claim that a court of common reason is either impossible
or impractical to construct. After all, there are logical problems concerning the
fairest way to present a variety of views on a given subject, there are psychological problems of how to motivate citizens to participate, there are political
problems getting Congress to authorize a trial of deliberative teledemocracy,
and so forth. Yet any large and new undertaking in human affairs produces
many skeptics-sometimes very knowledgeable skeptics-who charge that the
undertaking is either impossible or impractical. For example, ENIAC, the
breakthrough device that marked the beginning of the computer industry in
this country, was largely and actively opposed by members of the scientific
elite, including Vannevar Bush of MIT and George Robert Stibitz of Bell Labs.
Even after ENIAC was operational-it completed its first major computation
in December of 1945-there were plenty of distinguished skeptics. As late as
1947, for example, Howard Aiken of Harvard reportedly said that "there will
never be enough problems, enough work for more than one or two of these
computers."' 9 American democracy produced its own distinguished skeptics.
17. L.H. Butterfield, ed, 2 Adams Family Correspondence 30 (Harvard 1963).
18. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 35 The Writings of George Washington 31-32 (GPO
1938).

19. Nancy Stem, From ENIAC to UNIVAC: An Appraisal of the Eckert-Mauchly
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Jeremy Bentham thought the American revolutionists had "out done the utmost
extravagance of /all former/ fanatics."2" He believed the Declaration of Independence to be "a hodge-podge of confusion and absurdity."2' Nor was
Bentham alone in his misunderstanding of American democracy. Misled by a
tradition that includes Plato, Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, Hegel denied that the example of America "proves that republican states are possible
on a large scale,"" even though the Constitution had already been in force
for over forty years.
The source of these skeptical errors is a failure of self-examination-the
skeptics do not see that their experience and convictions might cripple their
imagination as to the feasibility or importance of some new undertaking.
ENIAC involved such a novel blend of so many disciplines-mathematical
logic, physics, chemistry, electronics, and so forth-that the skeptics were in no
position to claim either that it would not work or; if it did work, that it
would not be useful. In retrospect, their skepticism seems quite foolish. The
same holds true for the formation of the American government which involved
novelties of geography, written constitutions, explicit bills of rights, federalism,
and so forth. Could Bentham have been more wrong than to call the American
revolutionists "fanatics"? Could Hegel have been more wrong about the possibility of large republican states? Distrust of uncritical skepticism is as wise as
distrust of uncritical belief. Especially when faced with a fundamentally new
undertaking, it is important to ask in what respect one's own experience and
education might be misleading. A court of common reason involves such a
novel blend of logic, philosophy, political science, rhetoric, psychology, social
choice theory, law, statistics, and so forth, that it is difficult to justify initial
skepticism with solid evidence and reasoning. The only way to find out
whether a revolutionary technology-such as a computer, or a court of
common reason-is actually possible and useful is to make imaginative and
persistent attempts to create and use it. The issue cannot be. decided ahead of
time, even by the most knowledgeable.
In the end, and in the face of strong opposition, ENIAC was funded, not
because all doubts had been removed, but because the Army was desperate to
solve seemingly intractable problems of ballistic calculations. Are we not also
desperate to solve seemingly intractable problems of politics, desperate enough
to justify, in spite of doubts, a substantial test of Jefferson's revolutionary
idea? Yet no such test has been conducted. Why? The answer; I think, can be
found by looking at why the ancient Greeks did not use their technological
capabilities to make laborsaving devices. In my judgment, the most important
reason was a dogmatic or unconscious cynicism about the material world, and

Computers 111 (Digital 1981).
20. Timothy L.S. Sprigge, ed, 1 The Correspondence of Jeremy Bentbam 341-343
(Athlone 1968).
21. John Bowring, ed, 10 The Works of Jeremy Bentbam 63 (Simpkin Marshall 1859).
22. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History;
Introduction: Reason in History 169 (Cambridge 1980) (N.B. Nisbet, trans).
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about people who work with their hands, such as engineers or artisans. For
example, in Greek literature, Hephaestus, the divine craftsman, is the only god
with physical defects, and he himself is subject to ridicule. In philosophy, both
Plato and Aristotle disparaged physical matter and the laborer who works with
it. In mathematics, Archimedes thought it demeaning to apply his talents to the
physical world. Plutarch tells us that since Archimedes regarded "the work of
an engineer and every art that ministers to the needs of life as ignoble and
vulgar, he devoted his earnest efforts only to those studies the subtlety and
charm of which are not affected by the claims of necessity."" The Greeks,
then, often assumed that excellence and engineering are incompatible. In
retrospect, their view is easily refuted. Archimedes would be astounded to
know, for example, that the cattle problem which he made famous, and which
confounded mathematicians for twenty-two hundred years, was solved in 1981
in ten minutes by an engineering device-the Cray 1 supercomputer. 4 (The
solution, which gives the number of cattle, has 206,545 digits and takes up 47
computer pages!)
The cynicism that Plato, Aristotle, and Archimedes had about the engineering world, we have about the political world. It is typical for us to use
political as a pejorative term, to think of politicians as mainly or completely
corrupt, and to understand the people as the masses, incapable of any thought
or emotion that is not base. This cynicism contrasts strongly with the political
optimism of eighteenth-century Americans. Their optimism seems utterly
baffling to us. How, we wonder, could men so practical, and so well aware of
the defects and limitations of human nature, be so naive about politics?
Consider the words of the first four Presidents: Washington declared the
purpose of the American revolution was to achieve "the last stage of perfection
to which human nature is capable of attaining."' Adams thought that the
laws that govern our political life were as "uniform or certain" as the laws of
biology or physics and that it was crucially important "to make man, as man,
an object of respect."26 He had an absurdly optimistic aspiration for America
that nevertheless turned out to be correct. "It has ever been my hobby-horse,"
he said, "to see rising in America an empire of liberty, and a prospect of two
or three hundred millions of freemen, without one noble or one king among
them." 27 Jefferson's optimism was expressed by appealing to a scientific
conception. "[I]n time," he said, "all these [state governments] as well as their
central government, like the planets revolving round their common sun, acting
& acted upon according to their respective weights & distances, will produce
that beautiful equilibrium on which our Constitution is founded, and which I

23. Plutarch, 5 Plutarch's Lives 479-481 (Harvard 1961) (Bernadotte Perrin, trans).
24. Harry L. Nelson, A Solution to Archimedes' Cattle Problem, 13 J Recreational
Mathematics 162, 164 (1980-81).
25. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed, 26 The Writings of George Washington 227 (GPO 1940).
26. Charles Francis Adams, ed, 6 The Works of John Adams 218, 281 (Little Brown
1851).
27. Charles Francis Adams, ed, 9 The Works of John Adams 546 (Little Brown 1851).
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believe it will exhibit to the world in a degree of perfection, unexampled but
in the planetary system itself." 2 Not to be outdone, Madison thought that
"the destined career of my country will exhibit a Government pursuing the
public good as its sole object, . . . a Government... whose conduct within
and without may bespeak the most noble of all ambitions-that of promoting
peace on earth and good will to man. " 29
The lack of a history of feudalism and the incredible physical assets of the
North American continent, are just two of many reasons that have been given
for the tremendous political achievements of eighteenth-century Americans. In
my judgment, however, the most important reason is their conviction that
politics can be an arena of human excellence, a place where the noble and
talented can aspire to lasting honor and fame. Although the ancient Greeks
invented clever engineering devices--self-moving marionettes, sound-effects
machines in theaters, coin-operated vending machines for holy water, water
clocks, self-opening doors, steam engines-their cynicism crippled their imagination, and thus they did not develop their technology in ways that are
obvious to us. For example, they did not spend substantial sums of money
trying to create laborsaving devices even when slaves were expensive. And we
do not spend substantial sums of money trying to discover the common reason
of the American people. We have all the disciplines and technology to create
Jeffersonian teledemocracy, but fail to act, even in the face of an avalanche of
unsolved political problems.
Our cynicism may be understandable, but it is certainly paradoxical. In
biology, the human brain is presented as the most sophisticated and complicated thing in all of nature, with enormous flexibility and awesome powers far
beyond our present understanding. But in political science, ordinary people-human beings who possess these wonderful brains-are presented as
forever unwilling or incapable of the deliberative reasoning that excellent selfgovernment requires. We know that comparing a microprocessor to a human
being is like comparing a candle to the sun. Yet we are willing to spend
billions of dollars to create massively parallel computing that combines 64,000
or more microprocessors, but we do not even think of creating massively
parallel deliberation that combines 64,000 or more autonomous persons. We
treat microprocessors with respect, optimistically confident that we will
eventually make them collectively intelligent. We treat ordinary humans in their
political capacity with disrespect, cynically convinced that they are incapable
of being collectively intelligent. Our colleges and universities have rightfully
created departments of computer science in response to the enormous demand
to understand and improve computation by machines, but they have not
created departments of deliberator science since there is no similarly strong
demand to understand and improve deliberation by humans.
Yet the cynical claim that ordinary humans cannot collectively be intelli-

28. Paul Leicester Ford, ed, 7 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 210 (Putnam 1896).
29. Gaillard Hunt, ed, 8 The Writings of James Madison 384-85 (Putnam 1908).
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gent is dubious. Consider a theorem first proved in 1785 by the Marquis de
Condorcet. In a generalized form, Condorcet's jury theorem, as it is now
called, states that if voters are faced with yes-no questions, if they answer
them independently, and if the probability of an average voter's choice being
right is better than chance, then, as the size of the group increases, the probability of the group's majority decision being right approaches certainty."0 Thus
we should expect that if each person in a group of people takes an intelligence
test which has only binary choices, and if each works independently, the
chance of getting a perfect score through majority vote on each question
would approach certainty as the size of the group increases. This assumes that
the average person in the group is minimally competent, that is, on any given
question the person is more likely than a random device to give a right
answer. However, suppose that the average person is less likely to give the
right answer. Surprisingly, democratic hope is not thereby extinguished. For
example, in the classic 1957 movie Twelve Angry Men, each member of the
jury was wrong in his initial judgment (the jury was, so to say, maximally
wrong) but, because one juror wanted to deliberate, the jury eventually made
the right decision. In the design of the court of common reason, I tried to
increase the competence of the "average voter" by making that "voter" be a
subjury whose decisions are arrived at independently and are products of
deliberation and unanimous decision. If a majority exists and minimal competence is achieved then, as the number of subjuries is increased, the likelihood
that the best binary choice will be made increases without limit. For example,
by the mathematics of the jury theorem, if there are at least 13,628 subjuries,
where the chance of an average subjury being right is 51%, then the chance
that a majority of subjuries is right is greater than 99%. This example shows
that even minimal competence by unanimous subjuries can rather quickly
generate great proficiency by advisory juries. Advisory juries could thus create
new standards of excellence in articulating the voice of the people.
In my judgment, we can better understand collective political decisionmaking by studying successful deliberations in areas where a correct answer is
well-defined, such as in logic, medicine or engineering. By successful I mean
cases where the knowledge and talents of each individual in the group is
insufficient to get the correct answer, but where the group's collective deliberation is sufficient. The greater the divergence between individual and collective
achievement, the greater the success of the deliberative system. For example,
we might be able to devise a system which would rather consistently allow a
jury, whose subjuries are all made up of individuals with an IQ below average,
to deliberate and collectively achieve an IQ well above average. The experience
of devising successful systems for a variety of topics in which correct answers

30. See generally Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen, eds, Information Pooling and
Group Decision Making: Proceedings of the Second University of California, Irvine,
Conference on Political Economy 94-95, 173-92 (Jai 1986) (providing information on
Condorcet's jury theorem).
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are known could then be applied to political decisions. These decisions
generally involve judgments of preference or value, but such judgments, no less
than factual judgments, can be guided by deliberative reason. If that deliberation is careful and thorough, the judgments become the informed preferences,
or the informed values, which the Founders argued should be the basis of
public policy. We verify that computers are sound by having them calculate
the decimal expansion of 7r. Perhaps exercises in critical thinking, where
answers are known, could verify that advisory juries have deliberative competence in politics, where answers are controversial. For example, imagine an
advisory jury where each subjury is given instruction in critical thinking, and
then practices on questions with well-defined answers until some level of
deliberating competence is reached. (That level could be chosen by another
advisory jury.) Next the subjuries take up a series of questions concerning
political issues. After answering the political questions, each of the subjuries
again achieves the prescribed level of deliberating competence on questions
with well-defined answers. For advisory juries meeting this standard, we might
be justified in assuming that their average subjury is more likely than chance
to descry the true, long-term interests of the American people. If so, a series
of advisory juries exploring those interests could give an authoritative statement about the political aspirations of the American people, in effect, an
authoritative expression of the American dream.
It is a melancholy reflection that, after all these years, the theory has not
been sufficiently developed, nor the experiments performed, which are required
for carrying out Jefferson's teledemocratic agenda. What is the practical effect
of changing the size of subjuries? What arrangements will ensure that the
views of shy people are fairly represented? What kinds of instructions should
be given to advisory juries? How should political questions be broken up into
binary choices? How could we use random devices and second-order questions
to frustrate anyone who attempts to manipulate advisory juries? In seeking
"the cool and deliberate sense of the community," how, in practice, can the
passions which interfere with deliberative reason, such as racial or sexual
prejudice, be minimized or checked, while at the same time strengthening the
passions for truth and justice? The answers to these and hundreds of other
relevant questions are largely unexplored. Even my quite incomplete design of
a court of common reason contains guesswork because the tests necessary to
create successful "deliberator software" have not been carried out.
III. The Versatility of Courts of Common Reason
Now, as an experiment to stimulate our imagination, let us adopt the
political optimism of the eighteenth century. After all, if Jefferson, given the
meager resources available in his time, could conceive of the possibility of finding "the genuine sense of the people on any required point," should we not be
able to imagine doing it with the enormous resources at our disposal? Let us
further imagine, with eighteenth-century Americans, that the common reason
so revealed would express, on average, good judgment. If we do so, then it is

58

Roundtable

[4:47

easy to see that a court of common reason could be as revolutionary in the
moral and political world as the computer is in the scientific and business
world. For instance, Jefferson wanted the people, through their wards, to be
able "to crush, regularly and peaceably, the usurpations of their unfaithful
agents.""1 We can imagine an advisory jury giving a searching review of an
incumbent toward the end of his or her term of office. The jury would then
answer the question: Has this person, by lying or other means, betrayed the
public trust? If the answer is "yes," then the person would be ineligible to be
a future candidate. Such a procedure might bring more rectitude to political
office than all the rules of ethics and term limits that have ever been proposed.
Let me illustrate the versatility of a court of common reason with four
more examples. First, advisory juries could be used to nullify laws. Ordinary
trial juries already have this power. Jury nullification was defended by a
variety of revolutionary leaders, among them John Adams, Hamilton, John Jay,
Jefferson, and James Wilson.32 Trial juries have used this power to good
effect. For instance, juries frequently nullified fugitive slave laws by refusing to
convict, even in cases with overwhelming evidence of guilt. This power is
important in American political theory because it allows juries-representing
the people-to place limits on laws that they deem tyrannical or unjust or unfair, either generally or in the particular application before them. On the other
hand, there have been abuses, such as trial juries convicting defendants in the
face of convincing evidence of their innocence, or white juries refusing to
convict whites who committed crimes against blacks. Furthermore, the inconsistent application of a law resulted when one jury would nullify a law and
another would not in very similar cases. Hence a trial is not a well-designed
institution for the political task of eliciting the people's judgment about the
nullification of laws. In contrast, a court of common reason is such an
institution, since it would allow the people to decide in a responsible way
whether they approve of existing laws. Madison gave a warning about the
dangers of bad law:
It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of
their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read,
or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or
revised before they are promulged, or undergo such incessant changes
that no man who knows what the law is to-day can guess what it will
be tomorrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be

31. Ford, 10 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 45 (cited in note 9).
32. Charles Francis Adams, ed, 2 The Works of John Adams 253-55 (Little Brown
1851); William Johnson, ed, 3 Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of
Judicature of the State of New-York 345 (Wiley 1812) (Alexander Hamilton); A.J. Dallas,
ed, 3 Reports of Cases Ruled and Adjudged in the Several Courts of the United States
and of Pennsylvannia Held at the Seat of the Federal Government 4 (J. Ormrod 1799)
(John Jay); Paul Leicester Ford, ed, 3 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 236 (Putnam
1896); Julian Parks Boyd, ed, 15 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 283 (Princeton 1958);
Robert Green McCloskey, ed, 2 The Works of James Wilson 540-41 (Belknap 1967).
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a rule, which is little known and less fixed?33
Given the utter disregard, not to say contempt, that Congress has shown for
this warning, why not have the people, after due consideration, judge whether
major laws, such as the income tax code, satisfy their own standards of
simplicity, reasonableness, and stability? Scientists such as Kepler, Newton, and
Einstein tried to reduce the confusing mass of empirical information about the
planets to simple laws which experience will not falsify. Likewise, legislators
should strive to reduce the confusing mass of empirical information about the
people's informed values to simple laws which the people will not nullify. The
aesthetic element ought to be as haunting in the search for the best laws to
regulate society as it is in the search for the laws which regulate nature.
Second, the court of common reason could be introduced into the operation of our courts of law. "Were I called upon to decide whether the people
had best be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department," Jefferson once
said, "I would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative. The
execution of the laws is more important than the making [of] them."- The
people of Vermont apparently agree with Jefferson. In Vermont, lay judges,
who are supposed to represent the values of the people, are ordinary citizens
who sit beside legally trained judges and participate in their decisions. The
legal profession has continually tried to eliminate these lay judges-as it has
successfully done in every other state-despite their popularity among Vermonters. One can make legitimate criticisms of lay judges, but the'profession
has not tried to replace them with a mechanism that would ensure that the
day-to-day operation of the court is consistent with the informed values of the
people. A Vermont court of common reason could be the mechanism. For
example, an advisory jury could review a trial via a videotape, and hear what,
in retrospect, the police, judge, attorneys, defendant, trial jurors, et al., have to
say about it. The Vermont advisory jury could deliberate about such questions
as: Were selection procedures for the trial jury appropriate? Did the defendant
have adequate representation? Was the punishment fair? And so forth. Next
the advisory jury could be asked: Overall, was the quality of justice in this
case excellent, good, fair, poor, or very poor? By applying this procedure many
times an index measuring the quality of Vermont justice could be constructed.
Nationwide, a similar procedure could be applied to federal courts. Large
numbers of polls are now collected concerning the opinions and feelings of the
public, but are any of them, or all of them together, as important as an index
which would measure the people's considered judgment about the degree to
which justice prevails?
Third, a court of common reason could be used to interpret the Ninth
Amendment of the Constitution. The Ninth Amendment asserts that the American people have other rights which are not listed in the Constitution and that

33. Rutland, 10 The Papers of James Madison at 539 (cited in note 10).
34. Boyd, 15 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson at 283 (cited in note 32).
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these rights shall not be denied or disparaged. The problem with this Amendment is the inability or unwillingness of courts to make definite the unstated
rights. In fact, the first significant use of the Amendment by the Supreme
Court did not occur until 1964, when Justice Goldberg, in his concurring
opinion, had to find Ninth Amendment rights in the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people."3" Justice Black in his dissent argued that one
cannot avoid using "personal and private notions" in discussing those rights.
He noted sarcastically, "Our Court certainly has no machinery with which to
take a Gallup Poll. And the scientific miracles of this age have not yet produced a gadget which the Court can use to determine what traditions are
rooted in the '[collective] conscience of our people.'" 36 The court of common
reason is such a "scientific miracle" since it could give authoritative advice as
to what rights the people have under the Ninth Amendment. Actually, it could
be used to give advice about any part of the Constitution.
Fourth, the court could also help to solve problems of group conflict.
Consider racial conflict. Racial prejudice can indeed be strong, but it can be
countered by those political passions-such as the passion for justice-which
serve the common reason of society. Dramatic art could be used to arouse
such passions. We know from the ancient Athenian Festival that it is possible,
in a dramatic competition, for ordinary citizens to pick works of the highest
artistic quality. We copied the Greeks by reintroducing the Olympics-an
introduction that has regularly produced unmatched athletic excellence. We
could likewise copy, adapt, and improve upon the Athenian Festival. Imagine
that the court forms an advisory jury to judge a contest for the best dramatic
works whose central theme is racism in America. Suppose they pick the three
best. Then the court forms a new and special advisory jury exclusively from
people of one race. However, this special jury does not begin working until all
its members have seen the three plays. Then, operating as usual, the jury
answers a number of political questions. A second, special advisory jury is
formed consisting of members of a different race. The members also see the
same plays and answer the same questions. A set of issues on which the two
races differ is thereby identified. Finally, the two special advisory juries are
merged into one hybrid jury where each subjury consists of six people from
the first group and six from the second. The issues on which the two races
differ are then presented simultaneously, and compromises are made via vote
trading within each subjury. The decisions of the hybrid jury thereby resolve

the political issues for a given period of time in the same sense in which an
ordinary election resolves who will serve for a given period of time. After all
the centuries of conflict between the races or, for that matter, between the
sexes or social classes, would it not be prudent and wise to collect solid evidence as to where, after due deliberation and reflection, these groups actually

35. Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 493 (1964), citing Snyder v Massachusetts,
291 US 75, 94-95 (1933).
36. Id at 519 (Black dissenting).
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differ from one another? Would it not be sensible to let the members of the
groups themselves, rather than their leaders, make any necessary compromises?
Since the great problems of race and sex and class can nowhere be solved but
in the hearts and minds of the people, would it not be reasonable to construct
an institution in which art chosen by the people themselves informs these
deliberations, and perhaps transforms their hearts and minds? Maybe jurors
who felt transformed would also feel that the transformation itself is a good
to them, a possibility which could increase the desire to serve again on advisory juries. When we look at the Mayans we are amazed to find that they
used the wheel in their toys, but not elsewhere and, as a result, caused
enormous and unnecessary hardship to the workers who moved stones for
monumental architecture. When we look at ourselves should we not be similarly amazed to find that we often use art for amusement, but seldom in the
political work of building a humane society? As a result we cause ourselves
enormous and unnecessary hardship. For instance, suppose that years ago we
had set up a hybrid jury in Los Angeles which cost the exorbitant sum of a
billion dollars, not including an exorbitant 100 million dollars in yearly costs.
If the resulting dramatic art and deliberations prevented the riots following the
Rodney King decision, would not those exorbitant sums have been well spent?
Referring to Uncle Tom's Cabin, Frederick Douglass claimed that "[n]othing
could have better suited the moral and human requirements of the hour. Its
effect was amazing, instantaneous, and universal."3 1 If art could be of help in
the fight against slavery, why not use it to unite "the moral and human
requirements" in the fight against racism? In the kind of art they choose, in
the way they conduct their deliberations, the people could use their common
reason to overcome their own base emotions. Unfortunately, without adequate
tests, we assume that they are incapable of such self-control and devoid of the
aspiration to achieve it.
IV. Democracy and Racism
In discussions of race relations today it is sad that there are often crucial
gaps concerning the history of slavery in America. For example, within five
years of composing the Declaration of Independence, and at a time when
almost everything published in America on slavery was strongly and explicitly
in defense of blacks,3 1 Jefferson wrote Notes on the State of Virginia, where

37. Frederick Douglass, Life and Times of Frederick Douglass 282 (Collier 1962).
38. For examples from a large body of literature, see Samuel Cooke, A Sermon
Preached at Cambridge in the Audience of His Honor Thomas Hutchinson, Esq; Lieutenant-Governor and Commander in Chief; The Honorable His Magesty's Council, and the
Honorable House of Representatives, of the Providence of the Massachusetts-Bay in NewEngland, May 30tb, 1770 42 (Edes Gill 1770); John Allen, Watcbman's Alarm to Lord
N-b 27 (E. Russell 1774); Andrew Eliot, Twenty Sermons 50 (John Boyle 1774)
(available through National Register of Microform Masters); Daniel Byrnes, A Short
Address to the English Colonies in North-America 1 (James Adams 1775); Othello, Essay
on Negro Slavery, 4 American Museum 414-17 (Nov 1788); David Cooper, A Serious

62

Roundtable

[4:47

he claims that blacks are not as beautiful as whites, that color is important,
that they have an inferior form and hair, that male orangutans prefer black
women to female orangutans, that blacks give off "a very strong and disagreeable odour," that "their griefs are transient," that their imagination is "dull,
tasteless and anomalous," and that they are incapable of poetry.39 Jefferson's
loathsome views on race were repeatedly attacked while he was alive, 4 but
he did not disown them. In private conversation he was even less restrained.
Thus Augustus John Foster, a British diplomat who visited Jefferson at
Monticello, reported that Jefferson claimed that "little good" would probably
come from the abolition of slavery, that Jefferson believed emancipation "was
an English hobby, and that the English are apt to ride their hobbies to death,"
and that Jefferson "appeared to think that we should only render the Negroes'
fate more miserable by our perseverance in endeavouring to abolish the trade."
Not surprisingly Foster objected to "Mr. Jefferson's prejudices." 41 In 1810,
when a slave named Jame Hubbard escaped from Monticello and was captured, what was Jefferson's reaction to Hubbard's exercise of his unalienable
right of liberty? "I had him severely flogged in the presence of his old companions, and committed to jail." 42 "In the presence of his old companions"
is a telling phrase. On another occasion Jefferson conspired to increase the
terror of his slaves by having it appear that a refractory slave had been
executed.43 Further, it is unlikely that violence and threats of violence were
limited to males. Jefferson said, "I consider a woman who brings a child every
two years as more profitable than the best man of the farm. [W]hat she
produces is an addition to the capital, while his labors disappear in mere consumption."' But what if a female slave would resist being treated as a sow
or mare, what if she would resist becoming what Jefferson called a "breeding
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Slavery: forming a Contrast between the Encroachments of England on American Liberty,
and, American Injustice in tolerating Slavery 13 (Isaac Collins 1783).
39. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 138-140 (N Carolina 1955)
(William Peden, ed).
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woman"?' What then? While Jefferson kept several hundred slaves during his
whole life (manumitting only a few), Robert Carter, the largest slaveholder in
Virginia, arranged in 1791 to free all five hundred of his slaves." Even
Jefferson's schemes for general emancipation were morally objectionable. One,
for example, would involve the "separation of infants from their mothers;"
another argues that slavery should be allowed to spread in order to make the
slaves "happier" and "proportionally facilitate the accomplishment of their
47
emancipation, by dividing the burthen, on a greater number of coadjutors."
These facts do not present a complete account of Jefferson and slavery,
but they do show, paradoxically, that Jefferson's doctrine that slavery corrupts
the slaveholder applies to Jefferson himself. 48 Fortunately, his political philosophy transcends the defects of his character. According to that philosophy,
decisions made by the common reason of the people are morally superior to
decisions made by their leaders. Looking back, we can illustrate this point by
noting that in the South, when people educated or freed their slaves, legislatures reacted by making these admirable acts illegal. In the North ordinary
people could be equally enlightened. For example, in 1778 a proposed constitution for the state of Massachusetts was sent to the various towns for
approval. It was rejected. One of the reasons was Article V which denied
"negroes, Indians and mulattoes" the right to vote.49 Town after town objected to Article V. The town of Spencer gave the following reason: "we Concieve
that the Depriving of any men or Set of men for the Sole Cause of Colour
from giving there votes for a Representative, to be an Infringment upon the
Rights of Mankind." 0 Georgetown sarcastically said it rejected the Article
because "a Man being born in Afraca, India or ancient America or even being
much Sun burnt deprived him of having a Vote.""1 The towns of Hardwick,
Sutton, Boothbay, Blanford, Shelburne, Westminister, Rochester, and Douglass
all argued for the rights of blacks. Two years later the town of Hardwick
objected to the statement that "all men are born free and equal" in the revised
Constitution "lest it should be misconstrued hereafter, in such a manner as to
exclude blacks." The town's proposed amendment was: "All men, whites and
blacks, are born free and equal."' 2 While northern legislatures again and
again dodged petitions of freedom for slaves, the common people in juries did

45. Id at 43.
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not. "I never knew a jury, by a verdict, to determine a negro to be a slave,"
John Adams observed, "[t]hey always found them free." 3 Perhaps slavery itself could have been weakened and, in time, peacefully abolished, had it been
periodically debated in each state via Jeffersonian teledemocracy. We will never
know, but if we choose, we can know whether or not the people could, acting
through hybrid juries, transform America into a less racist or even a nonracist
society. A critic might object that hybrid juries would increase the divisiveness
of racial issues, but without extensive experiments, the critic, like myself, is
guessing.
V. The Politics of Self-Knowledge
A court of common reason will do more than merely find out what the
people, after due deliberation and reflection, think. It will create a new kind
of politics, a politics of self-knowledge. This politics contrasts sharply with
those chilling conceptions of social engineering-beginning with Plato-in
which schemes are imposed on the people or certain classes of people. Instead,
it requires a process through which an autonomous people can search their
own hearts and minds, and then impose on themselves, as an autonomous
person can, the outcomes of their own reasoning. With a self-conscious control
hitherto unknown in human history, the American people will be able to
examine and shape their national character; they will become their own
philosopher-kings. Genuine and democratic autonomy cannot exist without
deliberative soul-searching among the people themselves; it is the foundation of
political excellence in a free society; in eighteenth-century terms, it is the
foundation of public happiness. "Know thyself," John Adams declared, "is as
useful a precept to nations as to men. " '
Consequently, a politics of self-knowledge requires that the people be
liberally educated. That is, they should acquire the abilities necessary to participate in a self-governing society. Thus, just as we need a professional community highly trained in science to judge whether something is a genetic disease,
or a dinosaur bone, or a supernova, so we need a political community highly
trained in the liberal arts to judge whether we have equality, or justice, or
liberty. Today we are uncertain about the content of liberal education and
argue endlessly about canons and curricula. Yet we do not collect evidence. A
court of common reason gives us this opportunity. After advisory juries have
taken up some of the great political issues of our time, the participants could
discuss the skills and knowledge they needed to participate in the deliberation.
An analysis of those discussions could determine the core of the curriculum in
public schools.
We can again be guided by Jefferson: "In a republican nation, whose
citizens are to be led by reason and persuasion, and not by force, the art of
53. Massachusetts Historical Society, 5th series, 3 Collections 402 (Mass Historical Soc
1877).
54. Charles Francis Adams, ed, 4 The Works of John Adams 393 (Little Brown 1851).
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reasoning becomes of first importance." 5 From the first grade on, students
could get practice in the use of reason and persuasion by regularly participating in subjuries, initially dealing with school issues, but later with local, state,
national, and international politics. In time they would not only understand,
but directly feel, the necessity of free speech for the integrity of their decisions,
and thus the importance of the First Amendment in American society. They
could play games which would simulate both the ways in which political
leaders betray the public trust and the means the people can use "to crush,
regularly and peaceably, the usurpations of their unfaithful agents.""6 Conversely, they could be taught to recognize political virtue (as defined by the
court of common reason) and the means the people can use to entice the best
into serving. Perhaps a judicious use of art and hybrid juries in schools could
help abort the rebirth of group prejudice in each new generation. Students
could also be periodically asked what knowledge and skills they need to
participate in an advisory jury. Deliberating on the answer, they would teach
themselves the importance of their own liberal education. By frequently being
forced to choose among competing values in a subjury, students would gain
practice in the discipline of deliberative soul-searching, so that as adults they
would be prepared to make fateful, yet responsible, political decisions. Courts
of common reason, we can conclude, are an indispensable part of an education
that prepares citizens for excellence in self-government; they enable students
directly to learn the nature of free society and to acquire the habits necessary
to prosper inone.
VI. Alienation and Meaninglessness
Many citizens today are alienated from government and American society
generally. To these feelings of alienation are often added feelings of
meaninglessness, the fear that, in some ultimate sense, the universe has no
moral foundation. These facts are sometimes given as an explanation, indeed
as a justification, for our political apathy and cynicism. Yet some of the
Founders had similar feelings. In a remarkable letter, on February 29, 1802,
Hamilton wrote:
Mine is an odd destiny. Perhaps no man in the UStates has sacrificed or
done more for the present Constitution than myself-and contrary to all
my anticipations of its fate, as you know from the very begginning I am
still labouring to prop the frail and worthless fabric. Yet I have the murmurs of its friends no less than the curses of its foes for my rewards.
What can I do better than withdraw from the Scene? Every day proves
to me more and more that this American world was not made for me.5"

55. Lipscomb, 16 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson at 30 (cited in note 47).
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The experience of alienation could hardly be more poignantly expressed, yet
Hamilton made outstanding contributions to the cause of freedom. Nor is
meaninglessness seen as a justification for political apathy. Thus John Adams
ruminated:
A death bed, it is said, shews the emptiness of titles. That may be. But
does it not equally shew the futility of richess, power, liberty, and all
earthly things? The cloud-capt towers, the gorgeous palaces, the solemn
temples, the great globe itself, appear the baseless fabric of a vision, and
life itself a tale, told by an ideot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. Shall it be inferred from this, that fame, liberty, property and life,
shall be always despised and neglected? Shall laws and government,
which regulate sublunary things, be neglected because they appear
baubles at the hour of death?"8
Adams means, I think, that even if the earth is destined to dissolve and leave
not a rack behind, even if our earthly existence is in some ultimate sense
futile, even then, it is worth bothering about "fame, liberty, property, and
life," even then, the American revolution is worth pursuing. In that pursuit we
might today see some hope of creating a humane existence in a cosmos which
may be meaningless, and humanity itself a mere accidental byproduct of a
ghastly, evolutionary slaughterhouse.
Of course, eighteenth-century Americans did not know about Darwinian
evolution, but they generally accepted the Lockean theory of a state of nature
in which humans lived without government. There one had freedom but not
the security to exercise that freedom. Law under just governments not only
provides that security, it does more. Locke wrote:
For Law, in its true Notion, is not so much the Limitation, as the
direction of a free and intelligent Agent to his proper Interest, and pre-

scribes no farther than is for the general Good of those under that Law.
Could they be happier without it, the Law, as an useless thing would of
it self vanish; and that ill deserves the Name of Confinement which
hedges us in only from Bogs and Precipices. So that, however it may be
mistaken, the end of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve
and enlarge Freedom ....

James Wilson followed Locke when he argued that "civil government is necessary to the perfection of society [and] ... civil liberty is necessary to the

perfection of civil government."6" Civil liberty, Wilson believed, "retains the
free and generous exercise of all the human faculties, so far as it is compatible
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with the public welfare." 6 Human flourishing-"the free and generous exercise of all the human faculties"-is the essence of the pursuit of happiness and
it is democratic government alone that can reliably protect and extend that
right. To use contemporary terminology, Philadelphia freedom is better and
greater than Paleolithic freedom.
Just as deliberative teledemocracy can overcome the moral defects of a
state of nature, so it can overcome the moral defects of the dog-eat-dog
environment of evolution. The brutal competition among ideas in a court of
common reason could prevent that ruthless competition among people which
has been so characteristic of human history and prehistory. Let me illustrate
the competition among ideas by using a contrived example. Imagine that we
have an advisory jury with 6,000 people forming 500 subjuries. They are given
a tricky mathematical puzzle to solve where the correct answer is "yes," but
the answer seems to be "no." After much deliberation only one subjury sees
the trick. The vote of the subjuries is thus: 1 "yes," 499 "no." However, at a
later time the issue is taken up again by another advisory jury of the same
size. This second advisory jury would hear all the arguments which swayed
subjuries the first time. Learning the trick the vote is 500 "yes," 0 "no." This
is deliberative teledemocracy in action. A new and favorable idea, as in my
contrived example, should spread through successive generations of the
advisory juries the way a new and favorable gene spreads through successive
generations of living things. In courts of common reason, ideas are subjected
to a repeated and brutal competition where only the fittest survive, fittest, that
is, at promoting the flourishing of a free and autonomous people. By constantly improving the deliberative skill of the people and the means to express their
deliberative sense, we create the conditions for that political excellence which
alone can reliably protect the human animal against itself.
VII. The Risk of Experiments
Yet we not only fail to find out the reason of the people, we fail even to
improve the integrity of ordinary elections. For example, in 1977 a new form
of voting was discovered called approval voting. In approval voting, one
may vote for all, some, or none of the candidates who appear on the ballot.
The candidate who gets the most votes wins. Social choice theorists have
conclusively demonstrated that this form of voting, while not perfect, is
superior to those now in use; yet neither the federal government nor any state
government has adopted it. If a significant improvement in computers had been
discovered in 1977, is it credible that no computer company would now
employ it? In our society "the relentless pursuit of excellence" is a slogan for
a car, not a fact about our commitment to democracy. Hence we do not study
Condorcet's jury theorem as applied to deliberative decision; we do not
61. Id at 359.
62. See generally Steven J. Brains and Peter C. Fishbum, Approval Voting (Birkhlluser
1983).
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develop the logic of parallel deliberation; we do not determine the core of a
liberal arts education by empirically investigating what people now need to
know to maintain and improve self-government; we do not systematically
explore how to use art, chosen by the people, to inform democratic decision;
we do not create indexes of justice; in short, we do not aspire to democratic
excellence. A politics of self-knowledge remains a forgotten ideal of the
American revolution. The feeble attempts toward teledemocracy that we have
made so far-the "electronic town-meetings" of President Clinton or Ross
Perot-are founded on statistically invalid samples of the people, and are
directed toward influencing, rather than discovering, the views of the people.
Such meetings do not provide an appropriate environment for people to
deliberate among themselves. Here we must be especially wary. Cyberspace is
as fertile a ground for producing mobs as the village green. Radio talk shows
and interactive television have the power to create an environment where "passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason,""3 an environment where
electronic mobs are "not only incapable of deliberation, but prepared for every
enormity."64
A court of common reason could protect us. There the environment is
impartial, a meticulous sense of fairness regulates the presentation of opposing
arguments, each subjury is small and isolated, and the conditions for responsible deliberation are the best we know how to create. Designing that environment will not be easy. The effort to create and maintain courts of common
reason will be enormous, and there is a substantial risk of complete failure.
However, the substantial risk of complete failure did not prevent the creation
and adoption of the Constitution. Why should we exhibit only a cloistered
virtue in the cause of freedom?
VIII. America as an Ideal
"My most earnest wish," Jefferson dreamed, "is to see the republican
element of popular control pushed to the maximum of its practicable exercise." 6" How might that maximum be characterized today? Perhaps we can
create a completely pure, but deliberative, democracy. The decision to move in
that direction could be made by the advisory jury itself. Just as a client might
decide to take over more and more functions which had hitherto been carried
out by the client's lawyer, so the advisory jury might begin by giving advice,
but gradually act directly, until control by the jury reaches "the maximum of
its practicable exercise." Jefferson's dream would then come true. We do not
know what that maximum is. Yet we do know one thing: popular control can
be improved. Today popular control is hardly pushed beyond the minimum of
periodic elections and a few referenda. To end our apathy and cynicism we
need a large-scale test of Jeffersonian teledemocracy such as, for example,
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creating a court of comm6n reason for one of the smaller states. After all, the
great importance of ENIAC was to prove that an electronic computer is
possible and useful. The enormous demand for computation then led to an
intense competition for computing excellence. And there is no end in sight.
Everyone believes the next generation of computers will be better than the
present generation. The world of computers, like the state of science generally,
is in a state of permanent revolution. Like the ENIAC, the first sizable court
of common reason might break down often and produce a fair amount of
nonsense. But, also like the ENIAC, it might work better than any alternative
and allow unsolved problems to be successfully attacked. If so, the enormous
demand for better democratic government could create an intense competition
for democratic excellence and, like science, democracy itself could become
permanently revolutionary. Our present cynicism about politics would then
pass, and we would cease laughing at Madison's belief that "the destined
career of my country will exhibit a Government pursuing the public good as
its sole object."
Yet how could government officials be persuaded to construct such a test?
In my judgment the American people must be made aware of their ability and
responsibility to directly govern themselves. This could be done through
individual initiative. Theoreticians could turn their attention to the problems of
Jeffersonian teledemocracy. There are many relevant disciplines, from the wellknown, such as group psychology or voting theory, to the arcane, such as the
Delphi method or the logic of question and answer Some democratic organizations, such as unions or churches, might be willing to risk tests of the theoreticians' work. A large number of experiments would be necessary to determine
the best deliberator software for a given purpose, but foundations might be
willing to underwrite some of this research. There is no need to await government action. Rather; government action could follow successful private initiatives.
John Adams claimed that the debate which produced the Constitution was
"the greatest single effort of national deliberation that the world has ever
seen."" This was no doubt true, but we have the resources to outdo the
eighteenth century in deliberation by as much as we have outdone it in
communications. The superior communications that have allowed us to create
a global village might, in time, make possible a global teledemocracy. We
could create an international court of common reason. It could authoritatively
define "crimes against humanity" and decide what should be done about them.
Hybrid juries might tackle issues such as trade disputes between Japan and
America, or the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, or the problems
of the global environment. By applying their skills of political freedom, ordinary people all over the world could promote peace on earth, and might
succeed wherever the experts, politicians, and diplomats are failing. This may
seem to be an unrealizable fantasy. Yet had anyone predicted in 1945 that,
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fifty years hence, computers much more powerful than the ENIAC would be
microscopic and be made in the millions, that too would have seemed to be
a crazy, unrealizable fantasy. But it came to pass. With respect to an innovative technology the future cannot be known.
"So far has our city surpassed the rest of mankind in thought and
speech," the Athenian Isocrates boasted, "that her pupils have become the
teachers of others, and she has brought it about that the name 'Greek' no
longer connotes the race but the mental attitude, and men are called 'Greeks'
when they share our education rather than merely our common blood."67 The
American revolutionists hoped to create a new paradigm of human society, one
which would, in the words of James Wilson, "outshine the glory of
Greece." 6" America, which had learned so much from the rest of the world,
would become its teacher and, in time, the word American would signify not
only the people of the United States, but a new civilization, characterized by
an enduring democratic revolution relentlessly devoted to improving public
happiness and private flourishing. A century earlier the word had a different
meaning which Locke expressed when he stated that "in the beginning all the
World was America."69 Locke meant that the condition of being without civil
government, which then largely prevailed in America, was, in the distant past,
the common lot of mankind. Americans aspired to change that meaning by
creating a revolution and civilization whose spirit would spread to all parts of
the globe: "God grant," Benjamin Franklin declared, "that not only the Love
of Liberty, but a thorough Knowledge of the Rights of Man, may pervade all
the Nations of the Earth, so that a Philosopher may set his Foot anywhere on
its Surface, and say, 'This is my Country.'" 7" It was thus the hope of the
American revolutionists, a hope which is as attractive today as it was in 1776,
that it will become the common lot of all people to share in an enduring
democratic revolution, and that thereby, in this revised sense, all the world will
again become America.
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